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Abstract
Performance audits allow audit institutions to contribute to the improvement 
of the economy, efficiency, and/or effectiveness of public sector entities 
through the recommendations of their reports. To assess the impact of the 
performance audits carried out by EU Supreme and Regional Audit Institutions, 
this article analyzes whether these recommendations are implemented in 
practice or not. The results show that there are two main ways in which 
the recommendations included in the performance audit reports produce 
an impact: the Anglo-American way, based on auditee actions and follow-up 
processes, and the Germanic way, based on parliamentary action.
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Introduction
The global economic downturn has driven most governments to implement 
cutbacks and austerity measures while demands for more and better public 
services are greater than ever (Pollitt, 2010). Pressures for restraining the 
growth of public expenditure and for increasing efficiency and effectiveness 
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have been intensified since the global economic crisis in 2008 (Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2011) and, at the same time, mechanisms for improving the public 
sector, such as performance audits, have received increasing academic and 
professional attention.
The number of Supreme and Regional Audit Institutions (SAI and RAI) 
around the world that have a legal obligation to carry out performance audits 
have increased and many other SAIs and RAIs have expressed their interest 
in them (Arthur, Rydland, & Amundsen, 2012). Professionals and academics 
consider performance auditing to be a key mechanism in the improvement of 
the public sector in this period of austerity1.
An increasing body of research analyzes the impact and usefulness2 of 
performance audit reports on public sector efficiency and effectiveness 
(Morin, 2001, 2004, 2008; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013, 2014, 2015; Van 
Loocke & Put, 2011). We aim to contribute to the analysis of the effective-
ness of performance audit reports through a comparative study of EU RAIs 
and SAIs concerning the implementation of the recommendations of these 
reports.
Comparative research in public management reforms identifies the inter-
national trends and broad models that are present in Europe. In addition, it 
helps to determine whether differences between countries with different pub-
lic administration styles, such as France and the United Kingdom, are still the 
same as they were 30 years ago (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). In this article, 
international comparative research will help us to identify whether there are 
different approaches to performance audits in Europe and to analyze the 
impact of these approaches. This study compares the practices of the perfor-
mance audits carried out by the EU SAIs and RAIs and analyzes whether the 
recommendations of their reports produce an impact and whether this impact 
comes from auditee action, governmental action, and/or parliamentary 
debate. This parliamentary debate is key for the conceptual and interactive 
impact of performance audits (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2014)
Although most performance audit studies have focused on SAIs (among 
others, Arthur et al., 2012; Morin, 2008; Pollitt, 2003; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 
2011; Pollitt et al., 1999; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2015; Torres & Pina, 1999; 
Yetano, 2005), in countries with a regional configuration, RAIs also carry out 
performance audits. In fact, in countries such as Germany and Spain, most 
performance audits are carried out by RAIs rather than by SAIs (Yetano, 
2014). Thus, the results of RAIs activity need to be studied to give an overall 
view of performance audit in Europe.
The objective of this article is the identification of patterns in the imple-
mentation of performance audits and their impact. The analysis of the perfor-
mance audit activity and its impact in Europe aims to answer the following 
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questions: What is the current development of performance audits in the EU? 
When do performance audits generate impacts? Who implements the recom-
mendations after a performance audit? The answers to these questions will 
help us to understand whether performance auditing has an impact on gov-
ernmental management or whether it is merely a rhetorical instrument.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section “Variations in the 
Impact of Performance Audits” explains the main contextual points of refer-
ence of this study. “Methodology and Data” section describes the method-
ological aspects, and the section “Analysis of Results” contains the analysis of 
results. And the final two sections address the discussion and conclusions.
Variations in the Impact of Performance Audits
Although performance audits are intended to contribute to improving the 
operations of the audited entities (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2015), their effec-
tiveness as an instrument to control and to improve public administration 
should not be taken for granted (Morin, 2001). Performance audits should 
produce actions. We will look at impact as the capacity to produce these 
actions,3 either by changes in the practices of the auditee (usually measured 
by the implementation of recommendations) or by influencing the political 
debate (usually measured by the amount of attention gained in Parliament; 
Lonsdale, 2000). As a result of increasing interest in the impact of perfor-
mance auditing, academics have looked at it from different perspectives (Van 
Loocke & Put, 2011). Some authors focus on its effects at the macro-level, 
analyzing its impact in terms of fiscal policy, government effectiveness, and 
capital productivity (Blume & Voigt, 2007; Schelker, 2008). At the micro-
level, a common measure of this impact has been the recommendations 
implemented (Alon, 2007; Brown & Craft, 1980; Hatherly & Parker, 1988; 
Johnston, 1988; Milgrom & Schwartz, 2008). Pollitt et al. (1999) find that the 
proportion of recommendations of performance audit reports implemented is 
the most common measure of effect used by the UK National Audit Office, 
the Swedish Riksrevisionsverket (RRV), and the Dutch Algemene 
Rekenkamer (AR). Similarly, Van Loocke and Put (2011) indicate that the 
European Court of Auditors found that the most commonly used indicator of 
the impact of performance audits is the recommendations implemented or 
accepted. Morin (2001, 2004, 2008) and Reichborn-Kjennerud (2013, 2014, 
2015) measure the impact of performance audits based on the opinions of the 
auditees and on their contribution to the public debate.
Performance audits, like many public sector reforms, are often criticized 
for not leading to action (Bouckaert & Peters, 2002; Streib & Poister, 1999; 
Torres, Pina, & Yetano, 2011). The challenge that audit institutions must 
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overcome is the lack of implementation of their recommendations (van Zyl, 
Ramkumar, & de Rencio, 2009).
To interpret the adoption (real and rhetorical) and adaptation of public sec-
tor initiatives, institutional theory has been extensively used by academics in 
recent years (Johnsen, 2005; Pina, Torres, & Yetano, 2009; Ribeiro & 
Scapens, 2006). This theory is mostly concerned with the diffusion and 
spread of organizational models within a given organizational environment 
and with understanding organizations within larger social and cultural sys-
tems (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991). It assumes that a common 
way of gaining legitimacy is an alignment with rationalized institutional 
myths (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Isomorphism, a concept embedded in insti-
tutional theory, can be used to predict that audit institutions would adopt per-
formance audit as a “symbol” of efficiency and modernity. This prediction 
seems to be confirmed by the international diffusion of performance auditing. 
This adoption of internationally recognized “good practices” often creates a 
gap between rhetoric and reality (Pina et al., 2009). This gap or decoupling 
from the expected objectives is underpinned by the historical and sociologi-
cal approaches of new institutionalism which suggests that the functioning 
and performance of institutions are historically and culturally embedded. 
Thus, it can be expected that performance audit may be a rhetorical instru-
ment, in some cases, rather than a vehicle for change.
The variety of practices of performance audits (Shand & Arnberg, 1996; 
Tillema & ter Bogt, 2010) suggests that there is not only a dichotomy of rhetori-
cal versus instrumental implementation (Burns & Scapens, 2000; Siti-Nabiha & 
Scapens, 2005) but also different ways of introducing performance audits that 
lead to action. The concept of logic4 could explain variations in the impact of 
performance audits. Lounsbury (2008) argued that the study of variations in prac-
tice should be focused on the primacy of culture, rather than relying on mimesis 
(Lounsbury, 2008; Lounsbury & Ventresca, 2002). The socio-cultural contexts of 
organizations facilitate cognitive, normative, and regulative pressures that funda-
mentally shape organizational behavior (Scott, 2008). As a result, pressures of the 
institutional environment for the introduction of performance mechanisms may 
result in different configurations of the “same” reform. This approach implies 
substituting the idea of “diffusion as imitation,” which involves the spread of a 
certain model to a number of passive recipients (Campbell, 2004), by the organi-
zational adoption of reforms carried out by intelligent, performance-oriented 
managers who are conditioned by the cultural context.
Institutional environments are influenced by multiple and competing logics 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lounsbury, 2007), which, as shown by Lounsbury 
(2007), explain the various configurations of performance audit, “the varia-
tions on a theme” (Hood, 1995). The New Public Management (NPM) 
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promoted a performance logic, or managerial logic (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 
2014), that became embedded with other logics, rooted in geographical and 
cultural differences and broader belief systems. The logic based on culture 
explains variations in practice and provides legitimacy to specific actions and 
solutions (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lounsbury, 2007). Pollitt et al. (1999) 
argued that performance audit was more fruitfully adopted by countries with a 
common law tradition than by those with a strong administrative tradition. 
Different logics, like different public administration styles, lead to different 
approaches to performance audits that affect their impact and effectiveness. 
The national context of public administrations is frequently used to explain 
variations in public sector reforms (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994; Kickert, 1997, 
2005; Pina et al., 2009; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). The public administration 
style is an institutional logic, represented by the organizational and adminis-
trative culture, historical background, and legal structural elements (Pina 
et al., 2009), which is usually shared by a group of countries. A managerial 
logic is associated with Anglo-American countries while a state law logic is 
associated with Continental European countries (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 
2014). The Anglo-American countries seem closer to performance-driven 
ideas, such as performance audits, while Continental European countries have 
been structurally and culturally less hospitable to this kind of reforms (Pina 
et al., 2009; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). However, Continental European 
countries have also responded to environmental pressures for improving pub-
lic services by developing their own mix of reforms (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 
2011).
Anglo-American countries were more active in introducing performance 
budgeting, full accrual accounting, and performance measures. Audits were 
divided into financial-compliance audits and performance audits (Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2011). Nordic countries have followed a similar model of public 
sector reforms; Sweden was considered a leader in the diffusion and imple-
mentation of effectiveness audits (Pollitt et al., 1999). Continental European 
countries aimed to modernize their traditional bureaucracy by making it more 
professional, efficient, and citizen friendly, but they considered traditional 
bureaucracy had virtues that should be preserved (probity, predictability, con-
tinuity, close attention to the law). Administrative practice, in Continental 
Europe, is still marked by an overriding legalistic philosophy where civil 
servants require specific legal training (Jann, 2003; Ongaro, 2008). The dif-
ferences in public administration logic are expected to affect the diffusion of 
Performance Audits (PA).
Finally, differences in EU territorial structures require the study of the 
activity of the RAIs. RAIs in Austria, France, Germany, and Spain, in their 
respective territories, have external control of the economic and financial 
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management of regional and local public sector entities and, in the United 
Kingdom, of local governments and the National Health Service (NHS) enti-
ties. Although close cooperation between the SAIs and the RAIs is common 
in each country, their competences are over different public bodies.
Data and Method
A questionnaire on performance audit was sent to the SAIs and RAIs of EU 
countries with the backing of the EURORAI. At national and supranational 
level, 29 questionnaires were sent to 27 SAIs plus Norway5 and the European 
Court of Auditors (ECA). At regional level, 83 questionnaires were sent to the 
RAIs of Austria, France, Germany, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom, 
countries that have a regional configuration of the auditing system.6 The ques-
tionnaire was focused on the effects of performance audits in terms of the 
implementation of the recommendations by the auditees and the actions carried 
out by parliaments or governments after the publication of the reports. Other 
questions included in the questionnaire were related to the externalization of 
services/activities as a consequence of the reports, the attention devoted by 
parliaments to the reports, the characteristics of the development of perfor-
mance audits (resources devoted, number and type of reports, accountability of 
the results to citizens, contracting out), and the follow-up processes.
The data for this study were collected during 2012 and three reminders 
were sent to encourage SAIs and RAIs to fill in the questionnaire. The final 
sample consisted of 12 SAIs plus the ECA and 42 RAIs.7 The response rate 
at central and supranational level was 44% (13 out of the 29) and at regional 
level 50.6% (42 out of the 83 RAIs).The SAIs were from Belgium, Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Norway, Portugal, and Sweden, as well as the ECA. The RAIs included 
Austria (six of the nine RAIs of the country, 6/9), France (10/26), Germany 
(9/16), Spain (8/12), Poland (6/16), and the United Kingdom (3/4) (see 
Appendix A). The total sample included 17 countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom) plus the ECA. The sample represented 73.8% of the population of 
the EU 27 plus Norway at the 1st of January 2012. As can be seen in Table 1, 
in the majority of cases, the respondent was the President, Auditor General, 
or Director. Around 22% of the responses came from the Head of the 
International Department or Performance Department and 13% of the 
responses were from auditors.8 To verify and triangulate the data obtained 
through the questionnaire, we analyzed the performance reports or the sum-
maries published on the web of these audit institutions during 2013. The 
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contents of the reports, that is to say, the objectives, recommendations, refer-
ences to the follow-up processes, and their timeliness, were checked.9
Exploratory analysis of the data was carried out to identify the character-
istics of the performance auditing practices. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) 
and cluster analysis (Ward method) were applied to identify homogeneous 
groups among the SAIs and RAIs studied to test to what extent logics/public 
administration styles condition performance audit characteristics. Previous 
international comparative studies (Pina et al., 2009) have shown that these 
techniques are complementary methods whose main function is to simplify 
the complex patterns of associations among different entities. The MDS and 
cluster analysis not only find homogeneous groups, but also help to provide 
a graphical representation of them. Cluster analysis classifies a collection of 
objects—in our study, RAIs/SAIs—into a small number of groups or clusters 
which are mutually exclusive. It allows the formation of groups within the 
MDS exhibit on a statistical basis.
After identifying the homogeneous groups, and considering the differ-
ences among them, three indexes were created by adding up the responses 
given to the questions (see Table 5). One is focused on the effects of perfor-
mance audits and two are related to the logic/public administrative culture 
(Anglo-American vs. Continental European; see Table 5). The Mann-
Whitney U test detects whether there are statistical differences between the 
groups of cases with regard to the indexes developed later in this article.
Analysis of Results
First, the results of the MDS and cluster analysis, using the answers given to 
the questionnaire, are presented. These tools were used to detect the existence 
Table 1. Respondents to the Questionnaire.
President, 
director, or 
auditor general Auditor
Head of the International 
Department or 
Performance Department
SAIs and ECA  1 4  8
   7.7% 30.8% 61.5%
RAIs 35 3  4
 83.33%   7.14%   9.52%
Total sample 36 7 12
 65.45% 12.73% 21.82%
Note. SAI = Supreme Audit Institutions; ECA = European Court of Auditors; RAI = Regional 
Audit Institutions.
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of groups of audit institutions with common behaviors. Second, a description 
and interpretation of each group is carried out. Finally, the results of three 
indexes built to test to what extent these differences are justified by different 
models of performance auditing are described.
Almost all the SAIs/RAIs that answered the questionnaire carry out per-
formance audits, 44 of the 55 that answered, all those at national and supra-
national level, and many at regional level, Germany (8/9), Austria (6/6), 
Spain (5/8), France (9/10), Poland (0/6), the United Kingdom (3/3). 
Performance audits are compulsory in all the countries studied, except 
Poland: no Polish RAI carries out these audits. For our study, RAIs that do 
not carry out performance audit have been excluded.
Figure 1 shows the MDS results. On the basis of the MDS map, four 
groups have been identified using cluster analysis (see Appendix B): (a) the 
UK-Nordic group (12 cases), (b) the Germanic group (11 cases), (c) the 
French group (9 cases), and (d) “Other” (12 cases). The groups have been 
named considering the majority of the countries that integrate each group and 
Figure 1. MDS projection on Dimension 1 and Dimension 2.
Note. MDS = multidimensional scaling.
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the logics/public administration styles mentioned above. As in previous stud-
ies, not all the entities studied pertain to their foreseeable group (Pina et al., 
2009). A comparison among groups and a descriptive analysis of them is car-
ried out below, combining the information obtained from the questionnaire 
with the analysis of the websites.
Table 2 shows that 100% of audit institutions in the UK-Nordic group and 
80% in the Germanic group issue more than 10 performance audits per year. 
This percentage is slightly lower in the French group, 67%, and especially 
low in the “Other” group where only 50% issue more than 10 reports and not 
all audit institutions issue performance audit reports every year. The higher 
number of reports issued, the amount of resources devoted to performance 
auditing and the existence, in most cases, of specific personnel show that, in 
the UK-Nordic, Germanic, and French groups, the audit institutions have 
developed a structure for performance audit (see Table 2). By contrast, the 
“Other” group seems to have a lower development of performance audits. The 
differences in contracting out or using the help of consultants (see Table 2) 
suggest that there are various configurations for performance auditing, which 
will be explored below.
Group 1—The UK-Nordic Group
The first group includes the RAIs of the United Kingdom (England, 
Scotland, and Wales); the SAIs of Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, and 
Sweden); Belgium, Hungary, Lithuania, and Portugal; the RAI of 
Niederösterreichischer of Austria; and the ECA. This group shows the 
highest number of performance audits (see Table 2). The number of perfor-
mance audits exceeds 200 in Wales and 1,000 in England10 as they examine 
performance questions together with their yearly financial audits to local 
authorities. The audit institutions of this group devote significant resources 
in terms of budget to performance audits (between 25% and 75%). They 
prefer to carry out these audits internally and only contract experts for spe-
cific topics (see Table 2).
The audit institutions of the Nordic countries—Denmark, Norway, and 
Sweden—and the ECA focus more audits on effectiveness and on the three 
E’s than the other audit institutions included in this group. An important char-
acteristic of this group—except for Portugal and Hungary—is the timeliness 
of the reports. As can be seen in their webs, most of them publish the reports 
in the following year, as in the private sector.
In many audit institutions of this group, performance audits were devel-
oped at the same time that the audited entities introduced accounting and 
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management tools which facilitated the implementation of performance 
audits. In all, 83% of the SAIs/RAIs say that more than 50% of the auditees 
have performance measures and 66% of the SAIs/RAIs say that more than 
50% of the auditees have cost accounting and quantified objectives (see 
Table 3).
In this group, the entities audited usually implement the recommenda-
tions of the audit reports, and 92% of these RAIs/SAIs always go back to 
the entities to review whether their recommendations have been imple-
mented through “follow-up processes” (see Table 3). For example, in its 
annual report, the Hungarian SAI includes statistics about the recommenda-
tions implemented by the auditees. In this group, more than 30% of SAIs/
RAIs go back to analyze whether savings have been made (Table 4). These 
audit institutions present 75% of their performance audit reports in parlia-
ment for accountability purposes (Table 4). The changes after the perfor-
mance audit reports are usually undertaken by the audited entity itself (see 
Table 4).
This group of audit institutions shows the highest level of transparency as 
full reports are always available on their websites, except for Wales (see 
Table 4). In most cases, they also publish a summary in their websites. In 
addition, some of them, such as the RAIs of the United Kingdom and the SAI 
of Lithuania, elaborate special summaries for the press.
Group 2—The Germanic Group
This group is made up of the RAIs of Germany and Austria: six from Germany 
(Bayerischer, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Niedersächsischer, 
Rheinland-Pfalz, and Sachen-Anhalt) and five from Austria (Kärntner, 
Oberösterreichischer, Salzburger, Tirol, and Vorarlberg). The only exceptions 
are the RAI of Niederösterreichischer (AU), included in Group 1, and the 
RAI of Brandenburg (GE), included in the “Other” group. The Germanic 
group also shows a high number of reports (Table 1). The RAIs of this group 
often contract out performance audits (90% do it frequently; see Table 2). The 
group devotes more budgetary resources (around 75%) to performance audit-
ing than the first group.
The analysis of the reports published in their webs shows that, in most 
cases, their focus is mainly on economy topics. A total of 63% of the audit 
institutions say that a high percentage of audited entities, more than 50%, 
have implemented cost accounting. This enables their RAIs/SAIs to carry out 
economy audits. By contrast, only a low percentage of these entities have 
performance measures and quantified objectives (see Table 3).
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Almost all their performance reports are presented to parliament (90%) 
where the RAI/SAI and the audited entity debate the content and conclu-
sions of the audit report (Table 4). Only 36% of the RAIs publish the full 
report in their websites (Table 4) and the rest only upload a summary. So, 
this group gives greater importance to reporting to parliaments than to the 
public.
Not surprisingly, it is in this group that the effect of the performance 
audits is greater in terms of reforms promoted by parliaments and govern-
ments and in outsourcing (Table 4). This group helps the audited entities to 
implement their recommendations. The participation of the audited entity in 
the parliamentary debate and the introduction of its opinion in the reports 
show the political will for the performance audits to have a real effect.
Group 3—The French Group
This group contains only French RAIs, all the French RAIs studied (Corse, 
Franche-Comte, Ile de France, Midi Pyrenees, Nord Pas Calais, Nouvelle 
Calédonie, Picardie, Poitou Charentes, and Polynésie) that carry out perfor-
mance audits. Their homogeneous behavior is a consequence of the central-
ized French public auditing system, which makes them regional branches of 
the French SAI (the Court de Comptes and their RAIs share the same web 
with sub-pages for each RAI). The number of reports produced is lower than 
in the previous groups (see Table 2) even though they devote similar resources 
to performance auditing. They do not contract out or use external consultants. 
Most of the auditees do not have cost accounting, performance measures, and 
quantified objectives (Table 3).
The audit reports are rarely presented in parliament and governmental 
reforms have seldom been carried out after performance audits. The lack of 
parliamentary involvement should be balanced by the monitoring of the 
implementation of the auditing recommendations. In fact, these RAIs con-
sider that the greatest limitation of their performance audits is the absence of 
any negative consequences from not implementing their recommendations.
In contrast with the Germanic group, this group shows a high level of 
transparency since the full reports are always uploaded onto the website. A 
summary is also published in 44% of the cases. The response of the entities 
audited is often provided on the web.
Group 4—“Other”
This group, with a low activity in performance auditing, is quite heteroge-
neous. It includes five SAIs—Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Latvia, 
18 Administration & Society 
Lithuania, and Malta—and seven RAIs—Baden Württemberg and 
Brandenburg from Germany, and Andalusia, the Canary Islands, Catalonia, 
Navarra, and the Basque Country from Spain. The MDS representation 
(Figure 1) shows a great dispersion due to the variability of the responses.
Their performance audits have little effect because there is hardly any 
implementation of their recommendations or follow-up processes. The 
reports do not usually produce reforms. The few resources devoted to perfor-
mance audits, the lack of specific personnel, and the low use of external 
experts may explain the few reports in this group. Furthermore, the entities 
audited do not usually have cost accounting, performance measures, and 
quantified objectives (see Table 3). This lack is an additional barrier to carry-
ing out performance audits.
Performance audit indexes. The four groups previously identified present 
differences. To explore whether these differences are statistically signifi-
cant, three indexes have been elaborated (see Table 5) and the Mann-
Whitney test has been applied. The first index (A) combines the number of 
reports and effects of the performance audit activity. It will be used to ana-
lyze whether the effect of the UK-Nordic and the Germanic groups is 
noticeably different to the French and the “Other” groups. The B and C 
indexes have been elaborated considering the differences between the UK-
Nordic and the Germanic groups, which are considered to be two different 
logics/public administration styles that have achieved a noticeable impact. 
The objective is to test whether significant differences exist between these 
two models. We have also applied the Mann-Whitney test to the French and 
the “Other” groups to see if they are closer to the UK-Nordic or the Ger-
manic models.
Table 6 shows that the A index is higher in the UK-Nordic and the 
Germanic groups. The UK-Nordic model shows the highest effect in imple-
menting recommendations by the entities audited and the Germanic group 
shows the highest effect in parliamentary and governmental reforms. The 
right side of the MDS exhibit represents the SAIs/RAIs whose performance 
audits have higher impacts (see Figure 1). The fact that the UK-Nordic 
model achieves effects through the implementation of recommendations by 
the entity audited while the Germanic model does so through parliamentary 
and governmental reforms suggests different valid approaches to imple-
menting performance audit recommendations. It also explains why one 
group is in the top half of the MDS and the other in the bottom half. The 
scores achieved in the B and C indexes show that there are differences 
among the four groups identified in the way performance audits are 
introduced.
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As can be seen in Table 6, the differences in performance audit develop-
ment between the UK-Nordic and the Germanic groups are statistically sig-
nificant. Similarities between groups have appeared when two groups 
coincide in their low scores. For example, both the UK-Nordic and the 
French groups achieve a low score in the Continental European index and, 
for that reason, are similar. They are similar because neither of them is fol-
lowing the Continental European model. We can conclude that the two 
models, represented by indexes B and C, follow different strategies with 
regard to the implementation of the performance audit. The French and 
“Other” groups present a lower level of development and effects in perfor-
mance audit. The French RAIs show a mixed model. They share public 
Table 5. Performance Audit Indexes.
(A) Effect index 
(maximum 20)
(B) Anglo-American model 
index (maximum 29)
(C) Continental European 
model index (maximum 29)
Number of reports per 
year (0-5)
Mainly in-house 
performance audits, 
contracting specialist (0-2)
Performance audits are 
mainly contracted out 
(0-2)
Implementation of the 
recommendations by 
the auditee (0-5)
Audited organizations have 
cost accounting (0-4), 
performance measures 
(0-4), and objectives (0-4)
Audited organizations have 
cost accounting (0-4)
Introduction of reforms 
by governments or 
parliaments (0-5)
Follow-up of the 
recommendations (0-5)
Help in the implementation 
of recommendations (0-5)
Privatizations and 
outsourcing resulting 
from the audit reports 
(0-5)
Topics of social and 
political significance in 
addition to financial 
significance (0-3)
Topics of financial 
significance (0-1)
 Full reports published on 
the web (0-5)
Summaries published 
on the web (rarely full 
reports) (summaries 0-5 
and full reports 0-5 with 
reverse code)
 Low level of parliamentary 
debate (RAI/SAI) (high 
parliamentary debate 
adds in the Continental 
European model index)
High level of parliamentary 
debate (RAI/SAI, entity 
audited, and councilor/
minister) (debate 0-5 and 
participants 0-2)
 Quality control mechanisms 
(0-2)
 
Note. RAI = Regional Audit Institutions; SAI = Supreme Audit Institutions.
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sector characteristics with the Germanic group, which explain their score in 
the Continental European model. However, they achieve a slightly higher 
mean in the Anglo-American model because, when changes resulting from 
performance audits are implemented, this is done by the auditees. This 
explains why the French RAIs are not statistically similar to the UK-Nordic 
and Germanic groups (see Table 6). The “Other” group achieves the lowest 
scores in all indexes, so it is not possible to a model of performance 
auditing.
Discussion
This study outlines the state of the art of performance audits and the effect 
they have in the European Union. Most audit institutions have extended their 
“watchdog” role toward assuming new competencies with the aim of detect-
ing waste and inefficiency. Performance audits have been extensively imple-
mented, at least at the “formal” level. However, not all SAIs/RAIs achieve an 
impact from their activity. Impact is measured considering the extent to 
which performance audit recommendations are implemented and how those 
recommendations are implemented.
Performance audits are supported by a legal mandate in all the countries 
studied, except in Poland. In fact, Polish RAIs do not carry out perfor-
mance auditing. This suggests that a legal framework is a necessary condi-
tion for performance audit, especially in countries that have an 
administrative practice with a legalistic philosophy. As shown by Chelli, 
Durocher, and Richard (2014), regulation prompts organizations to com-
ply with law to ensure organizational legitimacy. However, legislation has 
proven to be insufficient to generate an impact. Traditionally, the introduc-
tion of public sector initiatives, such as performance audits, has been 
explained by isomorphism. Isomorphism predicts that the adoption of per-
formance audit may not always be driven by efficiency and effectiveness 
concerns but by the emulation of best practices implemented by other sig-
nificant organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). So, not all public sec-
tor initiatives produce an impact. As we show, the French and the “Other” 
groups produce no effect, as has happened in these countries with other 
public sector reforms (Pina et al., 2009; Rouban, 2008; Torres et al., 2011). 
As van Zyl et al. (2009) argued, some audit institutions consider that one 
political challenge is the lack of authority to ensure that their recommen-
dations are implemented. The results confirm that there are different ways 
for performance audits to produce impact. In the UK-Nordic group impact 
was achieved through the implementation of the recommendations by the 
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entity audited and, in the Germanic group, it was obtained through reforms 
carried out by parliament.
Lounsbury (2001, 2007, 2008), Covaleski, Dirsmith, and Weiss (2013), 
and Scott (2008) presented a refinement of institutional theory focused on the 
primacy of culture and on the existence of multiple and competing logics 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lounsbury, 2007). This refinement helps to 
understand various configurations of performance audit that have an impact. 
These different configurations are highly conditioned by logics/public admin-
istrative styles, in our article the Anglo-American and the Continental 
European models. It is confirmed that the adoption of the performance audit 
depends on previous traditions.
In the Anglo-American model, the impact of performance audits is mainly 
due to the implementation of recommendations by the entities audited. The 
change process initiated by the recommendations finishes with the follow-
up audits. The UK-Nordic group, which follows this model, also includes 
countries that are traditionally considered Continental European, such as 
Portugal, Lithuania, and Hungary. These countries seem to have followed 
the trend of the NPM with greater interest. This confirms that the search for 
internationally recognized practices still helps to explain how reforms are 
diffused. At the same time, the concept of logic/public administration style 
helps to explain why the cases of Hungary and Portugal show characteris-
tics, such as delayed reports, that illustrate that moving away from their 
traditional administrative culture is not easy. In many cases, their financial 
audits are fully carried out by private firms and performance audits are done 
in-house and use external consultants for specific issues. The lack of distinc-
tion between private and public sector auditing has led to the dismantling of 
the Audit Commission of England, an independent public sector entity in 
charge of local governments’ and NHS authorities’ auditing that existed 
between April 1, 1983 and March 31, 2015, and the transference of its activ-
ity to the private sector.
In the Continental European model, followed by German and Austrian 
RAIs, the effect of performance audits comes primarily from the reforms 
promoted by parliament. This way of introducing reforms explains why, in 
this group, there are lower levels of follow-up audits. These RAIs show ele-
ments of bureaucratic cultures in which the crucial budgetary audit is com-
plemented with economy audits. The legal training of civil servants in 
Germanic countries may explain why they frequently contract out perfor-
mance audits. The debates in parliament between the entity audited, the audi-
tor, and the politician responsible for the audited entity about the results of 
the audits and the reforms undertaken show that this public law model 
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produces effects. The negative image that bureaucratic cultures have had dur-
ing recent decades, and the lack of international dissemination of their prac-
tices, have led to a limited diffusion of the Germanic model.
The French and the “Other” are the groups with the lowest effect. In the 
French group, the lack of parliamentary action suggests that recommenda-
tions should be directly implemented by the entities audited. In the “Other” 
group, performance auditing seems testimonial. In this group, the audit 
institutions, based on their public sector characteristics and traditions, may 
choose either the Anglo-American or the Germanic model. In fact, the posi-
tion in the MDS map of the German and the Czech SAIs seems to anticipate 
that, once they improve the involvement of their parliament in the imple-
mentation of performance audit results, they will move toward the Germanic 
model.
Finally, the level of decentralization creates differences within the same 
country. In France, where decentralization is lower, there is greater homogeneity 
while, in Germany, the higher decentralization leads to greater heterogeneity.
Conclusion
The necessary, but not sufficient, condition for performance audits to gener-
ate impact is the legal framework. The absence of legal requirements shows 
a lack of political will that leads to shortages of resources with which to carry 
out performance audits. The sufficient condition is the implementation of the 
recommendations. Otherwise, performance audits become a source of waste 
and the resources used could be better used for other purposes.
Some financial reforms, especially those related to the budget, account-
ing, and performance measures, condition the role of performance audits 
and their consequences. In the UK-Nordic group, the audited entities have 
cost indicators, performance measures and defined objectives. All this 
information allows the RAIs/SAIs to carry out economy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness audits more easily. In the Germanic group, it is more frequent 
to find cost indicators than performance measures, which explains why the 
activity in performance audits of the RAIs/SAIs is focused on economy 
topics.
There is no single way to obtain impacts from performance audits. 
Institutional theory and the concept of logics/public administration styles 
help us to understand variations in the practice of performance audits. The 
Anglo-American model is not the only approach in the EU to carrying out 
performance audits and implementing recommendations, although it is still 
the model of reference in many cases. Actions are taken, in the 
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Anglo-American environment, through the direct implementation of the 
audit recommendations by the audited entities—which requires follow-up 
processes—and, in the case of Germanic countries, through parliamentary 
action. Performance auditing usually involves the collaboration of the private 
sector because both the UK-Nordic and the Germanic groups use external 
support. The legal training of civil servants in Continental Europe seems to 
affect the level of contracting out.
Future studies could analyze the savings achieved by these recommenda-
tions to conclude whether performance audits are cost-effective. This study 
considers only one source of variation (Power, 2003) in performance audit 
practice, that is, the influence of logics/public administration styles. Future 
studies should analyze others, in particular, in countries where territorial 
decentralization creates heterogeneity within the country and/or different lev-
els of activity between the SAI and the RAIs. The configuration of audit 
institutions as Offices or Courts is a variable that may condition performance 
audit developments, in this study this effect is embedded in the concept of 
public administration style rather than studied in isolation. Future studies 
could analyze this effect in isolation as done previously by Noussi (2012).
Appendix A
Participating RAIs and SAIs
Regional Audit Institutions. AUSTRIA
Kärntner Landesrechnungshof—www.landesrechnungshof.ktn.gv.at
Landesrechnungshof Tirol—www.tirol.gv.at/landtag/landesrechnungshof
Landes-Rechnungshof Vorarlberg—http://www.lrh-v.at/
Niederösterreichischer Landesrechnungshof—www.lrh-noe.at
Oberösterreichischer Landesrechnungshof—www.lrh-ooe.at
Salzburger Landesrechnungshof—www.salzburg.gv.at/lt-rechnungshof.
htm
FRANCE
Chambre régionale des comptes de Corse—www.ccomptes.fr/…./Corse
Chambre régionale des comptes de Franche-Comté—http://www.ccomptes.
fr/…./Bourgogne-Franche-Comte
Chambre régionale des comptes d’Ile-de-France—www.ccomptes.fr/…/
Ile-de-France
Chambre régionale des comptes de Midi-Pyrénées—www.ccomptes.
fr/…/Midi-Pyrenees
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Chambre régionale des comptes du Nord-Pas-de-Calais—www.ccomptes.
fr/…/Nord-Pas-de-Calais
Chambre régionale des comptes de Picardie—www.ccomptes.fr/…/Picardie
Chambre régionale des comptes de Poitou-Charentes—www.ccomptes.
fr/…/Aquitaine-Poitou-Charentes
Chambre territoriale des comptes de Nouvelle-Calédonie—http://www.
ccomptes.fr//Nouvelle-Caledonie
Chambre territoriale des comptes de Polynésie française—http://www.
ccomptes.fr//Polynesie-francaise
Chambre régionale des comptes du Limousin (we do not carry out perfor-
mance audit in the strict sense)—www.ccomptes.fr//Centre-Limousin
GERMANY
Bayerischer Oberster Rechnungshof—www.orh.bayern.de
Landesrechnungshof Brandenburg—www.brandenburg.de/landesrechnun- 
gshof
Landesrechnungshof Mecklenburg-Vorpommern—www.lrh-mv.de
Landesrechnungshof Sachsen-Anhalt—www.lrh.sachsen-anhalt.de
Niedersächsischer Landesrechnungshof—www.lrh.niedersachsen.de
Rechnungshof Baden-Württemberg—www.rechnungshof.baden-wuert-
temberg.de
Rechnungshof der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg—www.hamburg.de/
rechnungshof
Rechnungshof Rheinland-Pfalz—www.rechnungshof-rlp.de
Sächsischer Rechnungshof (we cannot answer, we do not differentiate)—
www.srh.sachsen.de
POLAND
Regional Chamber of Audit in Bydgoszcz (No performance audit)—www.
bydgoszcz.rio.gov.pl
Regional Chamber of Audit in Szczecin (No performance audit)—www.
szczecin.rio.gov.pl
Regionalna Izba Obrachunkowa w Gdańsku (No performance audit)—
www.bip.gdansk.rio.gov.pl
Regionalna Izba Obrachunkowa w Krakowie (No performance audit)—
www.krakow.rio.gov.pl
Regionalna Izby Obrachunkowa w Rzeszowie (No performance audit)—
www.rzeszow.rio.gov.pl
Regionalna Izby Obrachunkowa-w-Zielonej Górze (No performance 
audit)—www.zielonagora.rio.gov.pl
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SPAIN
Audiencia de Cuentas de Canarias—www.acuentascanarias.org
Cámara de Comptos de Navarra—www.camaradecomptos.org
Cámara de Cuentas de Andalucía—www.ccuentas.es
Sindicatura de Cuentas de Cataluña—www.sindicatura.cat
Sindicatura de Cuentas de las Islas Baleares (NO)—www.sindicaturaib.
org
Sindicatura de Cuentas de Castilla-La Mancha (NO)—www.sindicatura-
clm.es/paginas/index.php
Sindicatura de Cuentas del Principado de Asturias (NO)—www.sindicas-
tur.es
Tribunal Vasco de Cuentas Públicas—www.tvcp.org
THE UNITED KINGDOM
Audit Commission of England—www.audit-commission.gov.uk
Audit Scotland—www.audit-scotland.gov.uk
Wales Audit Office—www.wao.gov.uk
Supreme Audit Institutions
Auditor General and the Audit Office of the Republic of Cyprus—www.
audit.gov.cy
Bundesrechnungshof (Germany)—www.bundesrechnungshof.de
Cour des comptes (Belgium)—www.ccrek.be
Latvijas Republikas Valsts Kontrole (Latvia)—www.lrvk.gov.lv
National Audit Office (Malta)—www.nao.gov.mt
Nejvyssi kontrolni Urad (Czech Republic)—www.nku.cz
Rigsrevisionen (Denmark)—www.rigsrevisionen.dk
Riksrevisionen (Sweden)—www.riksrevisionen.se
Riksrevisjonen (Norway)—www.riksrevisjonen.no
State Audit Office of Hungary—www.asz.hu
Tribunal de Contas (Portugal)—www.tcontas.pt
Valstybes Kontroliere (Lithuania)—www.vkontrole.lt
European Union
European Court of Auditors—www.eca.europa.eu
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Notes
 1. International Seminar “Auditing—a consideration of the impact of the 
wider economic downturn on the role, coverage and resourcing of public 
audit” of EURORAI held in Edinburgh 2014. Members of Audit Scotland, 
Niederösterreichischer and Rekenkamer Rotterdam, among others, highlighted 
the importance of performance audit in the context of the economic downturn.
 2. With regard to the results of the performance audits, the public sector literature 
uses the words outcomes, impacts, actual results, effects, and/or consequences. 
We will use the word impact. Impact is defined as “the effect that something has 
on somebody/something.” Our focus is to what extent performance audit recom-
mendations have led to changes.
 3. The accountability dimension of the performance audit report is not denied, but 
it is outside the scope of this study. Important work in this area has been carried 
out by Reichborn-Kjennerud (2013, 2015).
 4. The concept of logic refers to broad cultural beliefs and rules that structure cog-
nition and fundamentally shape decision-making and action (Lounsbury, 2007, 
2008). Collective beliefs are objectified and thus “constitute social reality” 
(Greenwood, Hinings, & Suddaby, 2002) and create institutional logics.
 5. Although Norway is not an EU 27 country, the questionnaire was sent to obtain 
a wider picture of the Nordic countries.
 6. Countries such as Portugal and the Netherlands, where audits offices are only 
for two specific regions (Portugal) and for specific cities (the Netherlands), and 
which, therefore, do not have a country-wide structure for regional auditing, 
were excluded from the study.
 7. All the countries with RAIs are represented in the sample (Austria, France, 
Germany, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom).
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 8. A descriptive analysis of the study was sent for validation to respondents.
 9. A full content analysis is outside the scope of this work. Web translation tools 
were used to overcome the language barriers.
10. Data obtained from the analysis of the reports published on the website.
References
Alon, G. (2007). State audit and the media as the watchdogs of democracy—A com-
parative view. Iyunim—The Periodical of the Office of the State Comptroller and 
Ombudsman, 61, 55-100.
Arthur, A., Rydland, L. T., & Amundsen, K. (2012). The user perspective in perfor-
mance auditing—A case study of Norway. American Journal of Evaluation, 33, 
44-59.
Blume, L., & Voigt, S. (2007). Supreme audit institutions: Supremely superfluous? 
A cross country assessment. Centre for Economic Research (ICER). Working 
Paper No. 3/2007
Bouckaert, G., & Peters, B. G. (2002). Performance measurement and management: 
The Achilles’ heel in administrative modernization. Public Performance & 
Management Review, 25, 359-362.
Brown, R. E., & Craft, R. (1980). Auditing and public administration: The unrealized 
partnership. Public Administration Review, 40, 259-265.
Burns, J., & Scapens, R. W. (2000). Conceptualizing management accounting change: 
An institutional framework. Management Accounting Research, 11, 3-25.
Campbell, J. (2004). Institutional change and globalization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Chelli, M., Durocher, S., & Richard, J. (2014). France’s new economic regula-
tions: Insights from institutional legitimacy theory. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 27, 283-316.
Covaleski, M. A., Dirsmith, M. W., & Weiss, J. M. (2013). The social construction, 
challenge and transformation of a budgetary regime: The endogenization of wel-
fare regulation by institutional entrepreneurs. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 38, 333-364.
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited—Institutional isomor-
phism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological 
Review, 48, 147-160.
Dunleavy, P., & Hood, C. (1994). From old public-administration to new public man-
agement. Public Money & Management, 14, 9-16.
Friedland, R., & Alford, R. R. (1991). Bringing society back in: Symbols, practices 
and institutional contradictions. In W. W. Powell & P. DiMaggio (Eds.), The 
new institutionalism in organizational analysis (pp. 232-266). Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press.
Greenwood, R., Hinings, C. R., & Suddaby, R. (2002). Theorizing change: The 
role of professional associations in the transformation of institutionalized fields 
[Article]. Academy of Management Journal, 45, 58-80.
30 Administration & Society 
Hatherly, D. J., & Parker, L. D. (1988). Performance auditing outcomes: A compara-
tive study. Financial Accountability & Management, 4, 21-41.
Hood, C. (1995). The new public management in the 1980s—Variations on a theme. 
Accounting Organizations and Society, 20, 93-109.
Jann, W. (2003). State, administration and governance in Germany: Competing tradi-
tions and dominant narratives [Article]. Public Administration, 81, 95-118.
Johnsen, Å. (2005). What does 25 years of experience tell us about the state of per-
formance measurement in public policy and management? Public Money & 
Management, 25, 9-17.
Johnston, W. P. (1988). Increasing evaluation use: Some observations based on the 
results of the U.S. G.A.O. New Directions for Program Evaluation, 39, 75-84.
Kickert, W. (Ed.). (1997). Public management in the United States and Europe. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Kickert, W. (2005). Distinctiveness in the study of public management in Europe. 
Public Management Review, 7, 537-563.
Lonsdale, J. (2000). Developments in value-for-money audit methods: Impacts and 
implications. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 66, 73-89.
Lounsbury, M. (2001). Institutional sources of practice variation: Staffing college 
and university recycling programs. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46, 29-56.
Lounsbury, M. (2007). A tale of two cities: Competing logics and practice variation 
in the professionalizing of mutual funds. Academy of Management Journal, 50, 
289-307.
Lounsbury, M. (2008). Institutional rationality and practice variation: New directions 
in the institutional analysis of practice. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
33, 349-361.
Lounsbury, M., & Ventresca, M. (2002). Social structure and organizations revisited. 
Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 19, 1-36.
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure 
as myth and ceremony. The American Journal of Sociology, 83, 340-363.
Milgrom, T., & Schwartz, R. (2008). Israel’s auditor as policy change agent: The case 
of water policy. International Journal of Public Administration, 31, 862-877.
Morin, D. (2001). Influence of value for money audit on public administrations: Looking 
beyond appearances. Financial Accountability & Management, 17, 99-117.
Morin, D. (2004). Measuring the impact of value-for-money audits: A model for sur-
veying audited managers. Canadian Public Administration, 47, 141-164.
Morin, D. (2008). Auditors general’s universe revisited. Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 23, 697-720.
Noussi, K. (2012). How public accountability is institutionalized. Austria: University 
of Vienna.
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of 
Management Review, 16, 145-179.
Ongaro, E. (2008). Introduction: The reform of public management in France, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The International Journal of Public Sector 
Management, 21, 101-117.
Torres et al. 31
Pina, V., Torres, L., & Yetano, A. (2009). Accrual accounting in EU local governments: 
One method, several approaches. European Accounting Review, 18, 765-807.
Pollitt, C. (2003). Performance audit in Western Europe: Trends and choices. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 14, 157-170.
Pollitt, C. (2010). Cuts and reforms: Public services as we move into a new era. 
Society and Economy, 32, 17-31.
Pollitt, C., & Bouckaert, G. (2011). Public management reform: A comparative anal-
ysis: New public management, governance and the neo-Weberian State. Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press.
Pollitt, C., Gire, X., Lonsdale, J., Mull, R., Summa, H., & Waerness, M. (1999). 
Performance or compliance? Performance audit and public management in five 
countries. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Power, M. (2003). Evaluating the Audit Explosion. Law & Policy, 25, 185-202,
Reichborn-Kjennerud, K. (2013). Political accountability and performance audit: The 
case of The Auditor General in Norway. Public Administration, 91, 680-695.
Reichborn-Kjennerud, K. (2014). Performance audit and the importance of the public 
debate. Evaluation, 20, 368-385.
Reichborn-Kjennerud, K. (2015). Resistance to control—Norwegian Ministries’ and 
Agencies’ reactions to performance audit. Public Organization Review, 15, 17-32.
Ribeiro, J. A., & Scapens, R. W. (2006). Institutional theories in management 
accounting change: Contributions, issues and paths for development. Qualitative 
Research in Accounting & Management, 3, 94-111.
Rouban, L. (2008). Reform without doctrine: Public management in France. The 
International Journal of Public Sector Management, 21, 133-149.
Schelker, M. (2008). Auditors and corporate governance: Evidence from the public 
sector. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=959392
Scott, W. R. (2008). Approaching adulthood: The maturing of institutional theory. 
Theory and Society, 37, 427-442.
Shand, D., & Arnberg, M. (1996). Background paper. In responsive government: 
Service quality initiatives. Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development.
Siti-Nabiha, A. K., & Scapens, R. W. (2005). Stability and change: An institutionalist 
study of management accounting change. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 18, 44-73.
Streib, G. D., & Poister, T. H. (1999). Assessing the validity, legitimacy and function-
ality of performance measurement systems in municipal governments. American 
Review of Public Administration, 29, 107-123.
Tillema, S., & ter Bogt, H. J. (2010). Performance auditing: Improving the quality 
of political and democratic processes? Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 21, 
754-769.
Torres, L., & Pina, V. (1999). An empirical study on the performance of supreme 
audit. Institution in European Union privatization. European Accounting Review, 
8, 777-795.
32 Administration & Society 
Torres, L., Pina, V., & Yetano, A. (2011). Performance measurement in Spanish 
local governments. A cross-case comparison study. Public Administration, 89, 
1081-1109.
Van Loocke, E., & Put, V. (2011). The impact of performance audits: A review of 
the existing evidence. In J. Lonsdale, P. Wilkins, & T. Ling (Eds.), Performance 
auditing: Contributing to accountability in democratic government (pp. 175-
208). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
van Zyl, A., Ramkumar, V., & de Rencio, P. (2009). Responding to the challenges of 
Supreme Audit Institutions: Can legislatures and civil society help? U4Issue, 1. 
Retrieved from http://www.u4.no/
Yetano, A. (2005). Value for money audits and e-government: Benchmarking best 
practices. Public Performance & Management Review, 29, 111-124.
Yetano, A. (2014). The diffusion of value for money auditing at regional level: A 
comparative study of the United Kingdom, Germany and Spain [Article]. Gestion 
Y Politica Publica, 23, 421-464.
Author Biographies 
Lourdes Torres is full professor of Public Sector Accounting at the University of 
Zaragoza (Spain). Her research is focused on accounting, management, and auditing 
of public sector reforms and she has published articles many well-known international 
journals.
Ana Yetano is currently associate professor at the University of Zaragoza (Spain). 
Her research fields are performance measurement and management at local govern-
ment level and performance audits in the public sector. She has also explored citizen 
participation processes.
Vicente Pina is full professor of Accounting and Finance at the University of 
Zaragoza (Spain). His research is focused on the accounting, management, and audit-
ing of public sector reforms and has published articles in leading journal of Public 
Administration.
